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The Interaction of Law and Politics in Trade




Trade relations between the United States and the Soviet Union,
it is submitted, should be conducted on the basis of mutual economic
advantage and without regard to particular domestic or foreign poli-
cies of either country. It follows from this that the legal framework
of U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade should be so constructed as to facilitate the
mutual economic advantages of trade between the two countries and
to help insulate such trade against the influence of shifts in their
domestic or foreign policies.
Lest this argument be dismissed at the outset as a wholly unreal-
istic effort to divorce economics from politics, it must be emphasized
that the word "should" in the first sentence-"Trade relations be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union should be conducted
on the basis of mutual economic advantage"-is in part a political
word; it means that the political interests, inter alia, of both countries
require that trade between the two be given a certain autonomy, a
certain immunity from interference based on those same political
interests. Such autonomous, politically neutral areas of international
relations are, in fact, essential to the effective conduct of foreign
policy on the part of all countries and to the maintenance of a stable
international order. Perhaps the argument may be clearer if it is put
in these terms: it will serve the long-range policy of both the United
States and the Soviet Union to shield their trade relations from inter-
ference based on short-range policies.
Thus put even more cautiously, the proposition is one which,
unfortunately, has not yet been widely accepted. Both opponents and
proponents of expanded trade between the two countries have tended
to view such trade primarily as an instrument for effectuating politi-
cal goals, whether of "cold war" or of "detente."
The opponents of expanded trade have said, "Let us withhold
trade until the other side changes its obnoxious policies." The propo-
nents have said, "Let us expand such trade in order to induce the
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other side to adopt more favorable policies." Only a few have said,
"Let us conduct such trade as it is economically advantageous for
both sides to conduct-regardless of how good or bad our political
relations may be and without the purpose of securing particular polit-
ical advantages."
I have spoken of opponents and proponents of expanded trade as
though both existed in both countries. Actually, on the Soviet side
we have heard only from proponents, and the Soviet proponents have
spoken in terms of both the economic and the political advantages
which would accrue to both sides from the expansion of trade. Never-
theless, it would be a mistake to assume that there are not some
people in the Soviet Union-perhaps even in high places-who would
subordinate the economic considerations to the political. One may
conjecture that serious questions would arise for Soviet policy-makers
if, for example, the mutual economic advantage of U.S.-U.S.S.R.
trade threatened to diminish substantially the proportion of Soviet
foreign trade which goes to other socialist countries. One may also
suppose that some persons in the Soviet Union might prefer for politi-
cal reasons to strengthen commercial ties with Western Europe and
Japan rather than with the United States. However, the fact that
Soviet foreign trade is a monopoly of the state and is carried on solely
by state agencies makes it possible to allocate exports and imports
on political grounds without giving the appearance of so doing. More-
over, the Soviet government does not deny that it sometimes uses
foreign trade as a means of achieving particular objectives of foreign
policy. A few examples are the Soviet embargo against Yugoslavia
after 1948, the expansion of Soviet trade with Cuba after 1959, and
Soviet trade policies vis-a-vis Egypt and Israel from 1956 to the pres-
ent time.
Nevertheless, within limits such as these, Soviet trade policy
toward the industrialized non-socialist countries has been far less
politically motivated than has United States trade policy toward the
socialist countries. Starting in the middle 1950's, the countries of
Western Europe reciprocated the Soviet desire to expand trade with
them on the basis of mutual economic advantage, and as a result such
trade has increased steadily and rapidly during the past 20 years. The
United States, on the other hand, having erected a massive and com-
plex set of legislative and administrative restrictions upon trade with
Communist countries generally, suffered a diminution in its trade
with the Soviet Union almost to the vanishing point.
Finally, in 1968, the economics of the situation began to catch
up with the politics of it. For the first time, prominent American
business executives began to protest that our system of export con-
trols had only resulted in diverting substantial trade from us to West-
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ern Europe and Japan. The ironies of the situation were further com-
pounded by the fact that some of the Western European trade with
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was being conducted by foreign
subsidiaries of United States firms. In December 1968 some 2,000
representatives of leading business firms, assembled at the annual
convention of the National Foreign Trade Council in New York, voted
unanimously that the level of our export controls should be brought
down to the level of Western European and Japanese controls. In
1969, Congress, which had hitherto been hostile to any relaxation of
the restrictions on trade with Communist countries, enacted a new
Export Administration Act designed to encourage the Executive
branch to make our export control policy conform to that of other
countries associated with us.
Nevertheless, the relaxation of our export controls and of other
restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union went very slowly in 1969,
1970, and early 1971, partly because the President had not made up
his mind then to favor expanded U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade. Then grad-
ually in the latter part of 1971, and with a sudden burst in 1972 and
1973, the floodgates of U.S. export, credit, and shipping restrictions
were lifted and U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade swelled from $218 million of ex-
ports and imports in 1971 to about $1.5 billion in 1973. (U.S. trade
with other socialist countries also increased in the same period from
$388 million to almost $2 billion, including about $1 billion with the
People's Republic of China, against which country the United States
prior to 1972 had raised an almost total embargo on all transactions.)
The changes in American law which made possible this sudden
increase in trade with the Soviet Union were not, however, a result
of any change in the American view of the relation of foreign trade
to foreign policy, but rather were a result of a drastic revision of
American foreign policy itself. In fact, under the new American for-
eign policy, the integration of trade policy with diplomatic and mili-
tary policy became even greater than before. It was the Administra-
tion's view in 1972 and 1973, as in 1969 and 1970, that foreign trade,
or at least foreign trade with the Communist countries, is essentially
a handmaiden of foreign policy, and that the United States should
only relax its restrictions against such trade as part of an entire
process of relaxation of political tensions across a wide front. The
Administration was not interested in normalizing trade relations with
the Soviet Union until it could see the possibility of a total detente.
This was part of the famous "linkage" theory of Dr. Kissinger.
One may welcome both the sudden expansion of U.S.-U.S.S.R.
trade and the policy of detente without welcoming the implication of
an integral connection between the two. To be sure, after a long
period of acute tension between two countries, it may be necessary
1975
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that both should move slowly, by gradual steps, toward a coordinated
accomodation on many different levels. In the case of U.S.-U.S.S.R.
relations, however, accomodations had been reached on many mat-
ters in the 1950's and 1960's. Most of the trade restrictions of the
United States were anachronisms which could have been removed
independently at any time since the late 1950's. But even if this view
is not accepted, there is an obvious danger in carrying a "linkage"
theory beyond the point of the initial establishment of the detente
which is its objective. If political relations between the United
States and the Soviet Union should become less cordial, it would be
tragic to go through the experience of a resumption of trade restric-
tions on that account. But that is exactly what is threatened at this
moment. Similarly if something should go wrong with trade relations
between the two countries, it would be tragic if our political relations
should thereby suffer. Yet that might very well have happened in
1973 after the massive Soviet wheat purchases sent American bread
prices skyrocketing.
Thus a "linkage" strategy has the danger of being only as strong
as the weakest link. An alternative approach is to separate particular
conflicts, or particular aspects of a general conflict, from each other
and to attempt to resolve each one independently of the others. This
has been called the method of "fractionating conflict"-breaking a
conflict down into its component parts. It is a method which is partic-
ularly congenial to persons trained in law.
By breaking down international conflicts into their separate
parts, it becomes easier to measure the value of the various alterna-
tive responses that might be made. For example, if a particular gov-
ernment which is host to an international sporting event does not
permit athletes of certain races to play on its teams, other govern-
ments might appropriately respond by refusing to allow their teams
to participate in the event. Or to take another example, if a particular
government expels a diplomat of another government on grounds
which the other government considers not to be valid, an appropriate
response is the expulsion by the second government of one of the first
government's diplomats. It is argued against such an approach that
every government should have available to it the most diverse range
of devices through which to express its pleasure or displeasure. There
is, indeed, a superficial merit in this argument. The "eye for an eye"
theory of retaliation may not always be effective. For example, the
host government in the first example involving racial discrimination
may be entirely content with the non-participation of athletes from
other countries where racial equality is practiced. Yet it would be
very risky in such a case to attempt to exert other forms of pressure,
such as the withdrawal of diplomats or the restriction of trade, since
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these may be taken as independent offenses which in turn invite
further retaliation. Thus "linkage," which may be very useful in a
period of improvement of relations, becomes very dangerous when
relations begin to deteriorate at one or more particular points.
The fallacy of using trade restrictions to secure political objec-
tives is well illustrated, in my opinion, by the current efforts within
the Congress to induce the Soviet government to change its emigra-
tion policy by maintaining discriminatory tariffs against U.S. im-
ports from the Soviet Union and by forbidding the extension of gov-
ernment credits or credit insurance to American exporters to the
Soviet Union. These are inappropriate responses and it is therefore
very doubtful that they will achieve the desired objective. Even if
they should succeed, might not the Soviet government with equal
justification withhold some benefit from the United States-say, an
agreement to reduce armaments-until our government pardons per-
sons who refused to fight in Vietnam and eliminates de facto segrega-
tion in public schools? Unless there are generally shared principles
regulating international responses to felt grievances, there can only
be chaos and opportunism in international relations. Such principles
can only be based on some rule of the correspondence of the response
to the grievance.
Are there no circumstances, then, in which retaliation by trade
discrimination would be justified? I believe there are such circum-
stances, namely, where the retaliation is directed against the trade
discrimination of another party. If Country A imposes discriminatory
tariffs on imports from Country B, Country B is wholly justified in
imposing discriminatory tariffs on imports from Country A. This has
often been done. (In fact, the Soviet Union now imposes such retalia-
tory discriminatory tariffs upon imports from the United States. It
is, apparently, only a minor annoyance to Soviet importers of Ameri-
can products, affecting chiefly private persons who receive gifts from
abroad.) Similarly, an embargo may properly be met by an embargo.
It would be proper, I believe, though probably foolhardy under the
circumstances, for the United States to threaten to impose a food
embargo against Arab countries which impose an oil embargo against
the United States. It might even be proper for the United States to
threaten to prohibit trade transactions with the Soviet Union so long
as the Soviet Union supports an Arab oil embargo against the United
States. The point is, trade discrimination should be met with
counter-measures in the field of trade, not with counter-measures in
the field of cultural exchange or diplomatic representation or military
strategy. Otherwise there is a risk of violating the principle of non-
discrimination which is basic to sound international relations as well
as to international law. A disproportionate or an inappropriate mea-
sure of retaliation may constitute a discriminatory act. Thus the
application of one schedule of tariff rates to imports of all countries
1975
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except certain countries designated as Communist countries, or as
non-market economies which do not grant freedom of emigration, and
the application of higher tariff rates to imports from the latter coun-
tries, violates a fundamental principle of international order.
II
To maintain the autonomy of trade relations based on mutual
economic advantage it is necessary that there be a body of law which
not only protects trade against shifts in national policy but also facili-
tates mutual economic advantage.
It is-or will be-a major step toward the facilitation of mutual
economic advantage in Soviet-American trade relations to remove
the various forms of discrimination against Soviet trade that have
been introduced by the United States since the end of World War fl.
In the past, the most serious of these forms of discrimination was our
system of export controls, under which goods and technical data
could be obtained by the Soviet Union from companies located in
Western Europe, including foreign subsidiaries of United States
firms. Since approximately 1971, the Office of Export Control of the
Department of Commerce has reduced controls over strategic exports
to approximately the same level as that prevailing in Western Eur-
ope and Japan. A second step in the same direction has been the
d~termination by the President that credits and credit insurance may
be granted to the Soviet Union by the Export-Import Bank. Both
these measures were facilitated by acts of Congress (the Export Ad-
ministration Act of 1969 and the Export-Import Bank Act of 1971).
The removal of tariff discrimination against imports from the Soviet
Union would be a third measure of importance in facilitating trade
on the basis of mutual economic advantage.
These and other similar measures permit, or would permit, pri-
vate U.S. exporters and importers to trade with the Soviet Union on
the same legal conditions which are applicable to their trade with
other countries. In view, however, of the fact that Soviet foreign
trade, unlike that of most other countries with which U.S. firms do
business, is an integral part of a centrally planned economy and is
wholly operated by state agencies, other kinds of measures must also
be taken, both by the Soviet Union and the United States, if U.S.-
U.S.S.R. trade is to materialize in the most advantageous way for
both sides.
The planned character of Soviet foreign trade is designed to in-
sure that the Soviet economy as a whole benefits from each trade
transaction. The success of the individual Soviet foreign trade organi-
zations which export and import is measured by the extent to which
they fulfill plans and goals set by the Soviet state. In contrast, indi-
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vidual American business firms which trade with Soviet organiza-
tions measure their success by the extent to which they fulfill their
own individual plans and goals. By this system the public interest,
it is assumed, is served indirectly in the long run; nevertheless, any
given transaction, though profitable to the parties involved, may re-
sult in a net economic, political or military loss to the state.
Also, the bargaining power of an individual U.S. firm vis-a-vis
its Soviet trading partner is affected by the fact that the Soviet for-
eign trade organizations exercise a monopolistic trading power within
the Soviet system, and in addition, have the backing of the Soviet
state.
Thus in order to protect both the national interests of the United
States and the individual interests of U.S. firms, it is necessary for
the U.S. government to play a much more positive role in conducting
trade relations with the Soviet Union and other planned economies
than it is accustomed to playing in conducting trade relations with
market economies.
This fact is reflected in the 1972 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Agree-
ment, especially in Article 2 and in some of the Annexes. Article 2,
paragraph 4, establishes a commitment-stated, as is customary in
bilateral trade agreements between planned and market economies,
in the form of an expectation-of the Soviet government that its
foreign trade organizations will place substantial orders in the United
States for machinery, plant and equipment, agricultural products,
industrial products, and consumer goods. Also, Article 2, paragraph
3, provides that both governments "will examine various fields ill
which the expansion of commercial and industrial cooperation is de-
sirable . . . and, on the basis of such examination, will promote
cooperation between interested organizations and enterprises of the
two countries with a view toward the realization of projects for the
development of natural resources and projects in the manufacturing
industries."' Although some U.S. officials have referred to these and
similar provisions as merely "hortatory," they in fact represent the
results of serious bilateral discussions of the anticipated volume and
character of trade relations between the two countries over the next
few years. The Trade Agreement itself was preceded by the formation
of a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission, whose task was to
negotiate the agreement, to study prospects for various forms of eco-
nomic cooperation between the two countries, and to "[mlonitor the
spectrum of U.S.-U.S.S.R. commercial relations, identifying and,
1. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics Regarding Trade, Oct. 18, 1972, art. 2, para. 3, 67 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 595, 596 (1972).
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when possible, resolving issues that may be of interest to both parties
such as patents and licensing." 2 The Commission has appointed Joint
Working Groups to consider specific matters, such as the joint devel-
opment of Soviet natural gas resources.
The establishment of this intergovernmental framework for as-
suring the mutual economic advantage of both countries has resulted
in a significant expansion of the administrative role of the U.S. gov-
ernment in promoting trade with the Soviet Union. The Executive
Secretary of the American Section of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Com-
mercial Commission was appointed to head a new bureau within the
Department of Commerce, the Bureau of East-West Trade, which in
1973 had a staff of over 200 persons. The Bureau cooperates with its
counterpart in the Soviet Union in projecting trade between the two
countries, carries out its own studies of potential trade, and
approaches U.S. firms with suggestions. One official has said that
these promotional activities "sometime come very close to planning."
The fact that the Office of Export Control has been moved into the
Bureau of East-West Trade undoubtedly facilitates the coordination
of trade promotion with security controls.
The establishment of an intergovernmental agency for promoting
and controlling trade between the United States and the Soviet
Union, and of governmental machinery within each country for the
same purpose, should help to place U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade on the basis
of mutual economic advantage and to guard such trade against
shocks from shifting domestic and foreign policies of each country. At
the same time, it is likely that collaboration in this sphere between
officials of the two governments, as well as between U. S. business
firms and Soviet economic agencies, will produce considerable pres-
sures for changes within the Soviet system of foreign trade. These
changes would go in the opposite direction from the changes which
the new arrangements for U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade have produced in the
United States. As the tendency in the United States has been to
increase the role of the central authority, and especially the U.S.
Department of Commerce, so the tendency in the Soviet Union may
be to increase the role of the autonomous state economic agencies
that carry out trade and production activities. U.S. firms will want,
for economic reasons, to deal directly with the state enterprises that
are the ultimate users and producers of products. In addition, United
States firms will want to convert classical arms-length export-import
transactions into cooperation agreements involving co-production
and, ultimately, open-ended joint ventures. These pressures will call
for imaginative responses on the part of Soviet jurists, who will be
2. Communique Regarding the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission,
May 26, 1972, 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 898 (1972).
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asked to adapt their laws and regulations to types of economic activi-
ties which have not hitherto been highly developed in the Soviet
Union and which in some instances are quite new.
A very simple example is provided by the problems faced by
foreign firms in establishing offices in the Soviet Union. In 1955 a
leading Soviet authority on the law of foreign trade wrote: "Foreign
firms which intend to conduct continuous trade activity on the terri-
tory of the U.S.S.R. . . .[must] receive special permission from the
Ministry of Foreign Trade. In practice such foreign firms or their
representatives on the territory of the U.S.S.R. at the present time
do not exist." That situation has changed dramatically in the past
decade in that scores of foreign firms have been permitted to have
offices in the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, it took a very substantial nego-
tiation between the United States and the Soviet Union to establish
basic minimum rights of U.S. firms which wish to establish offices
in the Soviet Union.3 One may hope that a decade from now there
will be not five or six U. S. companies with offices in Moscow but
dozens of United States companies with offices in a variety of Soviet
cities, with the right not only to engage in export and import transac-
tions but also to establish joint ventures of the kind foreshadowed
recently in a speech delivered in Kiev by Secretary-General Leonid
Brezhnev. One may hope also that similar joint ventures will be
established with Soviet agencies in the United States.
If these hopes materialize, the long-range political importance of
insulating economic relations between the two countries from the
shocks of short-range political considerations will be abundantly ap-
parent.
3. See the letter of N. Patolichev to Peter G. Peterson, stating that "United States
companies will receive treatment no less favorable than that accorded to business
entities of any third country in all matters relating to accreditation and business
facilitation." See also the Attachment to the said letter entitled "Summary of Business
Facilities for Foreign Companies." Letter of N. Patolichev to P.G. Peterson, Oct. 18,
1972, 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 600 (1972).
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